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ABSTRACT
In a two-sided market with a broker, the broker can influence the buyer’s and seller’s optimal trading behaviour 
through strategic information design. We study the impact of information about waiting times on riders and drivers 
in a rideshare market. We consider three information regimes: the first in which no information about time is 
revealed, the second in which true waiting times are communicated, and finally an intermediate regime in which 
agents are only told whether their waiting time falls within a high or low category. We evaluate the optimality of each 
information regime by maximizing welfare and revenue for each setting and and that by concealing information, the 
broker can incentivize agents to accept less favorable trades. On the other hand, more information restricts trade to 
sufficiently favourable bargains, yielding higher expected welfare and expected revenue.
Optimal Information Design 
in Two-Sided Trade
By Pradhi Aggarwal1
1Program in Applied Mathematics, Yale University
1. INTRODUCTION
We study optimal information design in a two-sided trading prob-
lem where buyers and sellers trade over a single homogeneous 
product and a broker mediates the trade. We consider individually 
rational, incentive-compatible mechanisms and optimize for either 
welfare or the broker’s revenue.
Our study is motivated by and set in the context of rideshare mar-
kets. Rideshare platforms present a two-sided marketplace where 
agents have multi-dimensional preferences. For example, a rider 
seeking a ride on Uber typically values a ride based on its price, wait 
time, car type, driver rating, and so on. Similarly, a driver offering a 
ride on Uber typically values it based on the wage he receives, the 
opportunity cost of providing the ride, time or distance, passenger 
rating, and so on. The two most important factors for both agent 
types here are price and time. Buchholz et al. (2020) conduct an 
empirical analysis of the Czech-based taxi and ride-hailing appli-
cation Liftago in order to directly measure a customer’s value of 
time, or their willingness-to-pay for time savings, and study the 
impact of heterogeneity in value of time on a market where waiting 
time is used to ration the good. More recently, Goldszmidt et al. 
(2020) present an experimental analysis and estimate a consumer’s 
value of time in the United States using field experiments with the 
ridesharing company Lyft. Given the significant impact that time 
has in the rideshare context, we wish to study how a platform can 
use information about waiting times strategically. Both riders and 
drivers face a fundamental yet implicit trade-off between time and 
price. Although waiting times are non-negotiable and agents trade 
predominantly on price, can information about waiting times influ-
ence agent incentives and market outcomes?
The rideshare industry has recently prompted an extensive body 
of literature on optimal platform design with strategic agents. 
Ghili and Kumar (2020) study pricing mechanisms to respond to 
skewed spatial distributions of supply. Afeche et al. (2018) con-
sider the problem of matching riders with strategic drivers under 
varying levels of platform control. Besbes et al. (2018) propose 
location-specific pricing to control the spatial distribution of supply 
while Rheingans-Yoo et al. (2019) analyze revenue optimal pricing 
and driver compensation with drivers having heterogeneous prefer-
ences over location.
Our work differs from these papers in two aspects. First, instead 
of considering demand and supply as a whole, we fix a rider and 
driver and view the problem as a stationary game with two agents 
and a broker. This allows us to model a static Bayesian game of 
incomplete information, where the prior distributions of rider and 
driver valuations are public knowledge but they are unaware of 
each other’s realized valuations. Most importantly, we build on 
Myerson and Satterthwaite’s seminal 1981 paper, which presents 
Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational trade allo-
cation mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade 
or a broker’s revenue.
Secondly, while the above papers study optimal matching and pric-
ing mechanisms, we add information design as an additional lever 
the platform can use to strategically influence trade. Bergemann 
and Morris (2019) describe the information design problem as a 
study of how the mechanism designer can influence the individ-
ually optimal behavior of agents only through the choice of the 
information provided. Even if the broker cannot control outcomes 
or force agents to choose certain actions, she can influence them 
simply by choosing whether to and how to reveal information that 
agents depend upon when choosing an action. Bergemann and 
Morris (2019) present a broad overview of the literature on this 
topic and illustrate key insights, the foremost of which is that the 
mechanism designer may often find it optimal to selectively ob-
fuscate information. We vary information levels along two dimen-
sions: i) the platform revealing information about waiting times to 
riders and drivers, and ii) riders and drivers revealing their private 
valuations to the platform.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we 
describe our model. In section 3, we allow agent valuations to re-
main inaccessible to the broker and compute posted price mech-
anisms that maximize welfare and revenue for zero or complete 
information about waiting times. In section 4, we use a direct bar-
gaining mechanism to elicit valuations from riders and drivers and 
again compute welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing trad-
ing mechanisms. In section 5, we ask if an intermediate revelation 
about waiting times can achieve a better result and determine the 
corresponding optimal mechanism. In section 6, we allow for het-
erogeneous rider preferences over waiting times and study its im-
pact on the market. Finally, in section 7, we present a discussion of 
our results and conclusion.
2. THE MODEL
Our model contains two agents: riders, denoted by r, and drivers, 
denoted by d. The rideshare platform acts as a broker. Core param-
eters of the model include:
• w: the rider’s willingness to pay ~ U(0, 1)
• z: the driver’s opportunity cost ~ U(0, 1)
• x: waiting time, or transportation cost ~ U(0, X)
We assume that all prior distributions are public knowledge. The 
rider’s valuation is defined as her willingness to pay minus the 
squared transportation cost.
 (1)
Similarly, the driver’s valuation is the sum of her opportunity cost 
and squared transportation cost.
 (2)
In this context of this paper, we assume that the rider’s willingness 
to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost is independent of transpor-
tation cost. While this may be an unrealistic assumption, doing so 
allows us to separate heterogeneity in rider and driver preferences 
from the effect of transportation cost on rider values and driver op-
portunity costs. Then, we can evaluate valuations pointwise and 
don’t solve for the joint distributions. Both agent’s utilities are de-
fined as the difference between their valuation and the price of the 
ride, conditional on trade taking place.
If no trade takes place, utility is 0. We compute trading mechanisms 
that define an allocation rule and a price. The two outputs of any 
mechanism are as follows:
• p(w, z, x): price of the ride
• q(w, z, x): the probability of trade (1 for rides offered and 0 
for rides not offered)
3. POSTED PRICES INDEPENDENT OF w, z
The values w and z are private information of riders and drivers, 
respectively. We begin with a baseline model in which the broker 
does not have access to these realized values and only relies on the 
prior distributions. We consider two levels of information about x.
Proposition 1. Providing information about waiting times re-
sults in higher volumes of trade and expected welfare.
We show this in the remainder of this section.
3.1. No Information About Waiting Times
First, we assume that agents are given no information about real-
ized waiting times. Instead, they operate on the basis of the expect-
ed value . We impose ex-interim individual rationality con-
straints. That is, agents must have nonnegative expected utility 
from trade knowing their own willingness to pay or opportunity 
cost but before any trading outcomes are determined.
Thus, agents are willing to trade at the following set of prices
 (3)
In order to have nonnegative expected trade, we must have . 
Without any information about the realized values of w and z, the 
broker can set a welfare-maximizing fixed posted price that is inde-
pendent of w, z and agents will accept the ride whenever (3) is sat-
isfied. Expected welfare is defined as the sum of the two agents’ 
utilities multiplied by the allocation mechanism.
This is maximized at . Thus, the welfare-maximizing mecha-
nism is 
and gives us
3.2. Public Waiting Times
Next, we consider the case where the broker communicates the re-
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alized waiting time x to agents and repeat the same computations 
as above. Agents are willing to trade at the following set of prices:
(4)
which imposes the restriction . With (4) as the allocation 
mechanism and the broker setting a posted price,
which is again maximized at . Waiting time has a symmetric 
effect on riders and drivers in this model as w and z are identically 
distributed. Thus, information about x doesn’t influence prices in 
the absence of knowledge about the realized values w and z. The 
welfare-maximizing mechanism is given by 
We compute the expected welfare and expected volume of trade in 
this market for all realizations of x, keeping in mind that trade only 
occurs for .
Figure 1 displays expected welfare and Figure 2 displays expected 
volume of trade under the two mechanisms described in this sec-
tion.
Without knowledge of the agents’ realized valuations, the broker 
charges a price independent of waiting time. The first mechanism 
underestimates volume of trade and thereby welfare for realized 
waiting costs lower than the expected value. Conversely, it overes-
timates welfare for high waiting times. Revealing waiting times in 
the second mechanism results in higher volumes of trade and high-
er expected welfare, but restricts unfavourable trade where . 
This effect becomes more pronounced as X increases and a larger 
proportion of realized x2 values fall below the expectation.
4. BILATERAL TRADE
In this section, we augment the model with information about the 
realized values of w and z. Since these aren’t publicly observable, 
the broker must elicit them from the rider and driver. Our model 
uses the direct bargaining set-up described by Myerson and Satter-
thwaite (1983), in which each agent simultaneously reports his val-
uation to the broker and the broker then determines whether trade 
takes place and the price of the object. Each agent’s only action is to 
report w and z, respectively. In addition to individual rationality, we 
now impose incentive compatibility constraints. Incentive compat-
ibility is satisfied if honest reporting forms a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. That is, each agent can maximize her expected utility by 
reporting her true value, given that the other agent is expected to be 
honest. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) compute optimal trading 
mechanisms that are both individually rational and incentive-com-
patible. For a proof of their theorems, we encourage the reader to 
consult their paper. Here we simply follow their methodology as 
given, with the addition of waiting times in both agents’ valuations.
Theorem 1 of their paper characterizes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for incentive compatibility with individually rational 
agents:
 (5)
where vr, vd is each agent’s valuation as defined in (1)(2), Vr or Vd is 
the respective maximum value, and F(×) is the cumulative distribu-
tion function. The same equation holds true with the inclusion of x 
3YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
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to their model. We introduce some new functions as defined in their 
paper and modify our earlier definition of the allocation mechanism 
q(w, z, x). For any number α ≥ 0, let 
As in the previous section, we consider a setting with no informa-
tion about waiting times and one with complete information. Now 
that the broker has information about the difference between the 
rider’s willingness to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost, she 
can capture some of this difference by offering different prices. We 
solve for the revenue-maximizing mechanism in addition to the 
welfare-maximizing calculations and prove two propositions.
Proposition 2. Providing information about waiting times 
restricts trade but increases expected revenue.
Proposition 3. The revenue-maximizing mechanism is more 
restrictive than the welfare-maximizing mechanism.
4.1. No Information About Waiting Times
Plugging in our model parameters and  into (5), we must have
(6)
Thus, conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, the ex-
pected difference between their valuations must be at least ½. In 
other words,
This results in a stricter restriction than the one we had with only 
individual rationality in section 2. Now we must have .
Theorem 2 by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that an in-
centive-compatible mechanism such that ud(1) = ur(0) = 0 and q = 
qa for some  maximizes expected total gains from trade 
among all incentive-compatible individually rational mechanisms. 
Furthermore, in our context cd(z, x, 1) and cr(w, x, 1) are increasing 
functions and the interiors of the two valuation intervals have a 
non-empty intersection, thus such a mechanism must exist.
In order for each agent’s minimum utility to be 0, that is that ud(1) 
= ur(0) = 0 and q = q
a, we must satisfy (6) with equality. Plugging 
in the definition of qa
So we must have . The first value results in a mech-
anism that only allows trade if w – z ≥ 1, which is not feasible given 
that w, z . We pick the second value of a which gives us
Thus, welfare is maximized in a mechanism where trade takes 
place whenever the difference in the rider’s willingness to pay and 
the driver’s opportunity cost is at least X2 + ¼. The resulting ex-
pected welfare is given by
Since price has an opposite and symmetric effect on each agent’s 
utility, it does not appear in the welfare equation. We do not com-
pute an optimal price here but note that any price that satisfies in-
dividual rationality and incentive compatibility can be used. Under 
this mechanism, the expected volume of trade is
For the revenue-maximizing mechanism, let U0 denote the expect-
ed revenue of the broker, where
By Theorem 4 in Myerson and Satterthwaite’s paper, the broker’s 
expected revenue is maximized by a mechanism in which trade is 
allowed if and only if cr(w, x, 1) ≥ cd(z, x, 1). The revenue-maximiz-
ing allocation mechanism is 
All that remains is to construct prices that satisfy individual ra-
tionality and incentive compatibility. We define them in the same 
manner as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). If trade occurs, the 
rider is charged the lowest valuation she could have quoted and still 
gotten the ride and the driver is paid the highest valuation she could 
have quoted and still given the ride. It is easy to check that this 
is incentive compatible. For example, the driver reporting a lower 
valuation has no effect on prices and reporting a higher valuation 
decreases the probability of trade. Formally stated,
Under the revenue-maximizing mechanism, the broker should 
charge the rider  and should offer to pay the driver , 
and trade occurs if and only if both agents are willing to trade at 
these prices. The expected revenue is then
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20214
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4.2. Public Waiting Times
We now compute welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing 
mechanisms with the broker revealing realized waiting times to 
agents. To satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibil-
ity, we must have
Conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, the same con-
dition holds as with no information about waiting times:
Note that even before we optimize for welfare or revenue, incentive 
compatibility imposes the restriction x ≤ ½. If agents know how 
long they will have to wait, waiting times must be sufficiently small 
for market participation.
We determine a welfare-maximizing mechanism using the same 
methodology as the previous subsection. To have ud(1) = ur(0) = 0 
for q = qa, we must satisfy (9) with equality. 
Thus,  or  and we pick the second value, as before. The 
welfare-maximizing mechanism is defined by
The corresponding maximum expected welfare is given by
and the expected volume of trade is
The revenue-maximizing mechanism is given by
The broker should offer the following prices:
resulting in
Figure 3 plots expected welfare and Figure 4 plots expected volume 
of trade for welfare-maximizing mechanisms under no information 
and complete information about waiting times.
Communicating waiting times incentivizes agents to restrict trade 
to favourable waiting times, thereby increasing welfare and expect-
ed revenue. The revenue-maximizing mechanism under both in-
formation regimes is more restrictive than the welfare-maximizing 
mechanism, as seen in Figure 6, which plots the minimum differ-
5YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
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ence in w and z needed. In order for the broker to profitably exploit 
control over trading, she must demand a larger minimum difference 
in the rider’s willingness to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost.
5. INTERMEDIATE INFORMATION REVELATION
Providing complete information about waiting times allows the 
broker to optimally restrict trade, but forces her to only serve a 
limited range of waiting times or distances. The question arises: 
instead of the two extreme information settings we considered, can 
we do better through an intermediate revelation?
Suppose the broker informs agents only whether their waiting time 
fell into a low or high category. That is, for some , the bro-
ker reveals 
 could be exactly the halfway point 0.5X, but this is not necessar-
ily the optimal value as we show later. We restrict our attention to 
the scenario where the broker elicits w and z from the rider and 
driver. Without that, the posted price is independent of x, as we 
showed earlier.
Proposition 4. An intermediate information revelation re-
gime allows for a larger range of waiting times than complete 
information with only a small decrease in expected welfare 
and expected revenue.
We assume that the threshold  is public knowledge and agents 
choose actions based on their expected waiting cost . For low 
waits, the expected time is given by
And for high waits, agents expect
We compute welfare-maximizing mechanisms for the two catego-
ries separately and pick  to maximize the expected total welfare. 
To satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility for 
each of the time categories, we modify (6) with our new expected 
waiting times:
The second expression is positive only when
We then redo the calculations we did for bilateral trade under no 
information about x and define aL and aH for xL and xH, respectively. 
These model parameters are stated in the appendix while here we 
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20216
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simply describe the optimal allocation mechanisms.
Total expected welfare is given by
This expression is maximized at
And (10) simplifies to X ≤ 0.605. For low values of X where X ≤ 
0.605, trade will occur in both low and high time segments. This 
bound on X is stricter compared to the no information regime but 
allows trade for a large range of waiting times than those allowed 
by complete information.
For values of X beyond 0.605, we can no longer have trade in the 
higher segment since the required difference between w and z be-
comes greater than 1. As X keeps increasing, there will come a 
point when trade will not be possible in the lower segment either 
since  is a linear function of X. This occurs exactly at the point 
where X  > 1.171. However, the broker can always pick a different 
threshold value to still allow trade for low waiting times. When the 
broker provided no information about waiting times, no trade was 
possible once X crossed a threshold since the expected waiting time 
necessarily grew as X increased. By having two different time seg-
ments instead, the broker can maintain positive trade and still gain 
welfare and revenue even as X becomes very large. Specifically, for 
X larger than 0.605, the broker can choose a new threshold value to 
optimize for trade only in the lower segment. Now the objective 
function becomes
which is maximized at 
This value no longer depends on the maximum waiting time X, but 
instead maintains a constant volume of trade for a fixed subset of 
low waiting times. In summary, the welfare-maximizing mecha-
nism for intermediate information is
resulting in
We now construct a mechanism for revenue-maximization. For low 
waiting times, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is defined by
For high waiting times, the broker should implement
Here, too, the high wait category is restricted by (10). With low 
waiting times, riders are charged less and drivers are paid more 
compared to agents with high waiting times. Even though the prob-
ability of trade with higher waiting times is low, the broker reaps 
a higher revenue from those trades with higher waiting times that 
are realized. These results mirror what we often see in practice with 
rideshare platforms. For example, rides in the city centre have low-
er expected waiting times due to a higher supply of drivers and 
lower expected distances between riders and drivers. Such rides 
are often cheaper and drivers earn a higher wage by driving in the 
city centre. By contrast, rides in suburbs outside the city or in less 
busy areas tend to have higher expected distances, waiting times, 
and rider prices. 
The total expected revenue is calculated as the weighted sum of the 
expected revenue from each category.
which is maximized at
Plugging this into (10), revenue-maximizing trade is realized in 
both high and low segments for X ≤ 0.579. As with welfare-maxi-
mization, this bound is more restrictive than trade with no informa-
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tion but less restrictive than trade with complete information. For 
higher values of X, we can restrict our attention to the low waiting 
time segment and choose a different threshold value.
This expression is maximized at
Thus, the revenue-maximizing mechanism for intermediate infor-
mation is
 
And the expected revenue is 
Figures 7 and 8 display a comparison of expected welfare and ex-
pected revenue for the three information levels of x: no informa-
tion, complete information, and intermediate binary categories. 
The vertical line markers represent the point at which trade stops 
taking place in the high waiting time segment and is restricted to a 
small, fixed subset of waiting times. Intermediate revelation gets us 
remarkably close to the maximum expected welfare and expected 
revenue under full revelation and is less restrictive.
6. RIDER SENSITIVIY TO WAITING TIME
We now consider a preliminary extension of our model. So far we 
have assumed that riders have homogeneous preferences over wait-
ing times and both riders and drivers are affected identically by a 
change in waiting time. In reality, agents often have heterogeneous 
preferences. We relax this assumption and allow for variation in the 
rider’s sensitivity to waiting time.
Let s denote the rider’s sensitivity, where s ~ U(0, S). We redefine 
the rider’s valuation from (1) as
vr = w – sx
2
Intuitively, sensitivity represents a rider’s willingness to wait. For 
more sensitive riders, a unit increase in waiting cost leads to a 
greater reduction in their valuation of the ride. We restrict our atten-
tion to the setting where the broker communicates realized waiting 
times to agents. We also assume that rider sensitivities are public 
knowledge. The remaining model parameters are the same, with the 
small change that they now depend on s as an additional variable. 
We prove the following propositions.
Proposition 5. Increasing rider sensitivity reduces flexibility 
in the marketplace and has a negative impact on expected 
revenue.
Proposition 6. The cost of a rider’s higher sensitivity must be 
borne by the driver.
For individually rational, incentive-compatible trade, we plug in 
the rider’s new valuation into (5) to get
Thus, conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, we must 
have
w – z ≥ ½ + (1 + s) x2
and we must restrict trade to the subset of waiting times where 
. The more sensitive riders are to waiting times, the lower 
is the range of waiting times acceptable to them. The welfare-max-
imizing mechanism is
Intermediate calculations are included in the appendix. Higher val-
ues of s restrict trade by demanding that the rider have a higher 
willingness to pay or the driver have a lower opportunity cost. The 
negative impact on welfare is illustrated by the expression for ex-
pected welfare:
Holding all else constant, a higher sensitivity reduces welfare. 
Overall, welfare is decreasing in both X and S. However, the two 
variables offset each other. If riders are less sensitive to waiting 
times, the platform can provide service in larger areas than it would 
have been able to with homogeneous sensitivity. Conversely, high 
sensitivities allow trade for only sufficiently low waiting times.
We obtain similar restrictions for revenue maximization. Reve-
nue-maximizing trade occurs for
Higher sensitivity to waiting times reduces the probability of trade 
and revenue-maximizing trade is more restrictive than the wel-
fare-maximizing mechanism. We construct prices as per (7) and 
(8).
Aggarwal | Math and Economics
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This results in expected revenue
For higher sensitivities, the broker earns more revenue on realized 
trades. However, the probability of trade reduces faster than the 
corresponding increase in the difference in prices. In this particular 
pricing mechanism, each agent’s price depends on the other’s agent 
valuation rather than their own. As a result, notice that the cost of 
the rider’s sensitivity to waiting times is not borne by the rider her-
self, but is instead transferred to the driver. This must be the case 
under our model’s assumptions. Sensitivity serves as a proxy for 
the rider’s waiting time elasticity and we might expect that riders 
with different sensitivities would be willing to pay different prices. 
However, such a mechanism would no longer be incentive compat-
ible as riders would be incentivized to lie about their sensitivities. 
Instead, it is the driver’s willingness to compensate the rider for 
her sensitivity that makes trade possible. Thus, the platform should 
seek to match riders with high sensitivities to drivers with low op-
portunity costs.
For the broker to charge the rider a price dependent on her sensitiv-
ity, it would require that s is observable by the broker, either pub-
licly or indirectly, through a method other than direct reporting. In 
practice, rideshare platforms estimate a rider’s willingness to wait 
or her price elasticity of time based on location, time of the day, and 
other factors and charge higher prices during work commutes and 
rush hours. Knowledge about rider sensitivity could allow the bro-
ker to strategically vary price and waiting times as complements to 
each other. Buchholz et al. (2020) show that most people are much 
more price elastic than waiting time elastic, but a small set of riders 
have persistent and high willingness to pay a higher price for a re-
duction in waiting time. The platform could offer higher prices for 
quicker rides and acquire the flexibility to offer lower prices with 
higher waiting times to customers who are more willing to wait.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Varying the level of information agents have about waiting times 
influences an agent’s optimal behaviour and the platform’s wel-
fare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing trading mechanisms. 
Without knowing their true waiting times, agents are willing to 
accept unfavourable trades with high waits. However, such mech-
anisms overestimate transportation costs for low waiting times, 
which are precisely the trades that yield the highest welfare. By 
providing full information about waiting times, the platform can 
restrict trade to a favourable subset of waiting times and increase 
expected welfare and expected revenue. An intermediate revelation 
mechanism is able to achieve a desirable middle ground and yields 
welfare and revenue levels that are remarkably close to the full in-
formation regime.
Our paper poses interesting questions for further research on more 
complicated information structures. Waiting time is information 
that the platform has but agents don’t, and the platform can use it 
strategically to inuence bargaining. Bergemann and Morris (2019) 
note that the less information agents have about priors, the more 
strategically the broker can use information design. If the prior dis-
tribution of waiting times or the threshold value  in section 5 
weren’t public knowledge, as we assumed, the broker could com-
municate expected waiting times that were lower than , thereby 
improving outcomes for low realizations of x. Revealed waiting 
times could also well depend on w and z in order to incentivize 
agents to accept certain bargains. Such a setting could allow the 
broker to more fully exploit the tradeoff between time and money. 
For example, the broker may charge higher prices and offer lower 
waiting times to riders with a high willingness to pay. We only pro-
vide a preliminary discussion of heterogeneity in rider preferences 
over time, but further work on the topic could explore the impact of 
varied rider sensitivity on optimal information design.
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APPENDIX
Model Parameters for Welfare-Maximization in Section 5 
Under welfare maximization for low waits, , resulting in
For high waits, , and
Model Parameters for Welfare-Maximization in Section 6
The functions needed for welfare maximization are given by
and expected welfare is maximized when
The only value of a for which trade is feasible is
resulting in
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